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not hearsay, are admissible
By Cynthia Ford
Sworn witness, in court, subject to jury observation and 
cross-examination: 
A: “I was there, I saw him run out of the liquor 
store with a gun in his hand.” 
Q: “Can you identify the person you saw?”
A: “Yes, he is right over there (pointing), wearing 
the orange jumpsuit.”
This is not hearsay, because of the first requirement of the 
hearsay definition in 801. This is not an out-of-court statement. 
The fact that it is an in-court statement means that the hearsay 
rule does not apply. The dangers of hearsay do not exist: the 
witness is sworn, the jury can observe the witness as she testifies 
and use that observation to help decide if she is telling the 
truth, and opposing counsel has the opportunity to test the 
identification through cross-examination, ““greatest legal engine 
ever invented for the discovery of truth.”1 Because the in-court 
identification is not hearsay, and it is based on the witness’ 
personal knowledge, Rule 802 does not apply and the testimony 
is admissible. 
Out-of-court identifications look like, smell like, 
hearsay, but are also admissible as non-hearsay
As we have seen in earlier installments, Rule 801(d) operates 
as an exception not to the hearsay rule (802), but to the hearsay 
definition of 801(c). M.R.E. 801(c) provides that “Hearsay is a 
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying 
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted.” M.R.E. 801(d) is entitled “Statements which 
are not hearsay.” The statements it lists are all made out-of-
court and are offered to prove the truth of the matter they assert. 
Nonetheless, 801(d)’s magic wand transforms them from clear 
hearsay to clear non-hearsay and thus beyond the reach of Rule 
802. Rule 801(d)(1) lists three types of prior statements, made 
out-of-court, by people who later come to court as witnesses,2 
which are not hearsay even when offered for the truth of the 
1  5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 1367, at 32 
(James H. Chabourn ed., Little Brown 1974). See generally Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 
308, 316 (1974) (“Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believabil-
ity of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.”)
2  I have previously discussed the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements 
(801(d)(1)(a)) and prior consistent statements (801(d)(1)(b)) in the two previous is-
sues of Montana Lawyer.
matter.
The last of these prior statements by witnesses is M.R.E. 
801(d)(1)(C):
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant 
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement, 
and the statement is … (C) one of identification 
of a person made after perceiving the person. 
(Emphasis added).
The Montana Commission Comment to this subsection 
indicates that, different from the variation between the Montana 
and federal versions of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the Montana language 
of (C) is identical to the then-existing version of F.R.E. 801(d)(1)
(C). 3 The Commission gave three reasons for this exception to 
the hearsay definition, quoting both McCormick and the federal 
Advisory Committee:
There is substantial authority for the admissibility 
of these statements, “often without recognition of 
the presence of a hearsay problem”. McCormick, 
Handbook on the Law of Evidence 603 (2d ed. 
1972). The reasons for admitting these types of 
statements are first, “the generally unsatisfactory and 
inconclusive nature of courtroom identification ... ”; 
second, the higher reliability of prior identifications 
“made at an earlier time under less suggestive 
conditions” (Advisory Committee’s Note, supra 
56 F.R.D. at 296); and third, questions as to the 
reliability of identifications are really concerned with 
constitutional issues and not a hearsay problem. Id.
The Commission also noted that there were only two 
Montana cases dealing with the admissibility of out-of-court 
identifications, and stated that “neither is on point.” 
Montana Caselaw before MRE 801(d)(1)(C)
The two cases cited by the Commission are State v. Fisher, 
54 Mont. 211, 215, 169 P 282 (1917), and State v. McSloy, 127 
Mont. 265, 273, 261 P2d 263 (1953). In both, there were pretrial 
identifications which were recounted at trial, over objection, and 
the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the admissibility of the 
3  The current language of F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C) is still similar:
“(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement. The declarant testifies and is subject to 
cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement: … (C) identifies a 
person as someone the declarant perceived earlier.”
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identifications on appeal.
State v. Fisher was a murder case, in which the two 
defendants were convicted and sentenced to death for a Butte 
murder during a “hold-up.” The victim, Higgins, was taken 
to a hospital and lived several weeks before succumbing to 
septicemia. The police brought the two defendants to his bedside 
twice, once on the day after the shooting and again a few days 
later. The first time, Higgins identified O’Neill, one of the men 
in custody, as the man who shot him (he was not sure about 
the other man). The Supreme Court opinion reproduces the 
colloquy between accused and accuser which followed the 
identification:
O’Neill responded: “Brother, look here; this is a 
very serious proposition; be careful, you know, and 
be sure.”
Higgins rejoined:“I am quite sure; it was either 
you or your ghost.”
The second identification occurred at the hospital 
later in the month, a day or two before Higgins died:
Towards the last of September the appellants, 
pursuant to a promise made them by the officers, 
were again taken before Higgins in the St. James 
Hospital. Higgins had been told that the officers did 
not wish the appellants inculpated unless they were 
the guilty parties; yet upon their presentation Higgins 
said to O’Neill:
“You are the man that laid me here in bed; you 
are the man that shot me; I am positive of that,” –to 
which O’Neill answered:
“This is a very serious proposition; be careful; are 
you sure I am the man?”
And Higgins rejoined:
“You are the man.”
State v. Fisher, 169 P. 282, 283 (Mont. 1917). 
Higgins died before trial, and thus was not a witness; the police 
officers at the two hospital identifications did testify about those 
identifications. 
On appeal, the defendants contested the admissibility 
of Higgins’ out-of-court identifications, arguing that the 
prosecution had not laid adequate foundation for a “dying 
declaration.” 
The Supreme Court upheld the admission of the 
identifications, but on grounds different from either 
“identification” or “dying declaration:” “The evidence was 
admissible as showing the conduct and declarations of Higgins 
within the observation of the accused, and their conduct in 
relation thereto, all touching a matter vital to the issues in 
this case.” State v. Fisher, 169 P. 282, 284 (Mont. 1917). (This 
seems to be the “res gestae” or “transaction” trump to a specific 
evidentiary objection, which itself is grist for an entire mill and 
hopefully would not work today). What is important for our 
purposes is that the pretrial identification was admissible. Note, 
however, that Higgins’ identifications fail the definition of non-
hearsay under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C) because Higgins did not 
testify at trial and was not subject to cross-examination about the 
pretrial identifications. Thus, today his identifications would be 
hearsay (and, even if a hearsay exception applied, would violate 
the defendants’ constitutional right of confrontation).
Similarly, the pretrial identification in State v. McSloy was 
admitted and affirmed on appeal. (McSloy later was overruled on 
other grounds). The McSloy case involved the rape of a 10 year 
old boy by a stranger in Anaconda. The stranger had been in a 
car, talking to a boy named Freddie “Sonny” Martz. The victim, 
James Connors, knew Sonny and rode his bicycle up to the 
driver’s side of the car. The driver asked James if he wanted a job, 
which would require driving a bit west of town but would only 
take a short time. James agreed and got in the car. The driver 
took Jimmy to a secluded spot, tied him up, and raped him. 
Jimmy escaped and ran to a nearby home. 
McSloy was soon arrested and placed in a lineup. Sonny 
Martz was brought in and immediately identified McSloy. 
Sonny testified at trial. In the courtroom (so not hearsay), he 
identified defendant McSloy as the man who drove Jimmy away. 
Sonny also testified that the defendant was the same man he had 
identified in the sheriff’s office lineup shortly after the crime. 
Defense counsel cross-examined Sonny about the identifications, 
and the prosecutor conducted redirect. Then the victim’s father 
testified about what he saw when Sonny was confronted with the 
lineup and identified McSloy as the perpetrator.
Error is assigned in permitting Pat Connors, the father of 
prosecuting witness, to testify as to what he observed when the 
witness Martz identified defendant in the sheriff’s office. He 
testified: “Mr. Derzay called Sonny Martz into the office where 
they placed various men in a line-up around the office-men in 
plain clothes, and these men were mostly dressed for the rodeo-it 
was about the time of the rodeo here in Anaconda and they were 
dressed up in western outfits, plaid shirts, etc., and they asked 
Sonny Martz if he saw the man in here that had offered him the 
job and the ride, and the boy said, ‘That’s the man,’ and the door 
to the office was open a little and Mr. Derzay told Sonny to go 
over and touch the man.”
The cases bearing upon this method of proving the 
identification of defendant are in conflict but the trend of recent 
cases is to admit such evidence.
State v. McSloy, 127 Mont. 265, 273-74, 261 P.2d 663, 667 
(1953). The Montana court followed the trend it described, and 
held the testimony about the pretrial identification admissible:
The court did not err in permitting the witness to 
testify as to what he saw and observed regarding the 
identification. The only effect of the corroborating 
evidence is to show that the prosecuting witness 
identified the accused at a time when there had been 
no opportunity for the witness to be swayed by any 
suggestion of others. Defendant’s counsel was still 
privileged to argue to the jury that the witness was 
mistaken in the identification, and this is so whether 
one or a dozen persons witnessed the identification. 
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In other words, the correctness of the identification 
still depends upon the accuracy of the recollections of 
the one person making the identification.
State v. McSloy, 127 Mont. 265, 275, 261 P.2d 
663, 668 (1953). The Court supported its admission 
of pretrial identifications with an extensive quote:
Mr. Wigmore in his work on Evidence discusses 
this question as follows: ‘Ordinarily, when a witness is 
asked to identify the assailant, or thief, or other person 
who is the subject of his testimony, the witness’ act of 
pointing out the accused (or other person), then and 
there in the court-room, is of little testimonial force. 
After all that has intervened, it would seldom happen 
that the witness would not have come to believe in the 
person’s identity. The failure to recognize would tell 
for the accused; but the affirmative recognition might 
mean little against him.
‘The psychology of the situation is practically 
the same as when Recent Contrivance is alleged. To 
corroborate the witness, therefore, it is entirely proper 
(on the principle of § 1129, ante) to prove that at a 
former time, when the suggestions of others could not 
have intervened to create a fancied recognition in the 
witness’ mind, he recognized and declared the present 
accused to be the person. If, moreover (as sometimes 
is done) the person was then so placed among others 
that all probability of suggestion (by seeing him 
handcuffed, for example) is still further removed, the 
evidence becomes stronger. The typical illustration is 
that of the identification of an accused person at the 
time of arrest * * *.
‘This is a simple dictate of common sense, and 
was never doubted in orthodox practice. That some 
modern Courts are on record for rejecting such 
evidence is a telling illustration of the power of a 
technical rule of thumb to paralyze the judicial nerves 
of natural reasoning.’ IV Wigmore on Evidence, 
3d ed., § 1130, pp. 208, 210. Many cases are there 
cited, some taking the one view and some the other. 
In the note on page 214 the author in criticizing an 
Oklahoma case excluding such testimony said, ‘Courts 
are lamentably blind to the error of this doctrine, 
which flies in the face of common experience.’
127 Mont. at 274-75, 261 P.2d at 667-68 (1953). 
Thus, before the M.R.E. were promulgated and adopted, 
the Montana Supreme Court allowed pretrial identifications 
into evidence, whether through the testimony of the identifier 
or through the testimony of others who observed the prior 
identification. M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C) is consistent with this 
jurisprudence, but imposes a requirement that the identifier 
testify at trial. 
Montana Caselaw after MRE 801(d)(1)(C)
The “identification exemption” from the definition of 
hearsay is virtually absent from Montana jurisprudence. I 
searched Westlaw Next for the term “801(d)(1)(C)” and came 
up with 20 cases. However, when I read and analyzed these 
cases, I found that none of them actually applied 801(d)(1)(C) 
at all. Interestingly, in several of the reported cases a pretrial 
identification made by a person who later testified at trial could 
have been admitted simply under Rule 801(d)(1)(C), but that 
subsection was never discussed in the appellate opinion, and 
apparently not at trial either. Using this subsection would have 
greatly reduced the difficulties in these cases, at both the trial and 
appellate levels. I will discuss the cases in reverse chronological 
order. 
In the 2001 case of State v. Giant, the victim reported to 
both the hospital and police that she had been attacked by her 
husband, Giant. Accordingly, the State charged and prosecuted 
the husband, relying so heavily on the victim’s identification 
that it failed to do any forensic testing of the evidence found at 
the home. At trial, though, Mrs. Giant surprisingly testified that 
the attacker was not the husband but her eldest son, and that 
she purposely misidentified the husband both to protect her son 
and to punish her husband. The jury convicted the husband, 
although the only evidence of his guilt was the prior identification 
(recanted at trial) and the fact that the husband had fled after the 
attack. Under Montana law, neither piece of evidence standing 
alone could justify the verdict.4 On appeal, the issue was whether 
the combination of the two would suffice.
The Montana Supreme Court approached the problem as 
one of admissibility of the witness’ prior inconsistent statement, 
rather than of identification. The Supreme Court observed 
that the rationale for admission of such statements outside the 
definition of hearsay was similar to that for the admission of 
pretrial identifications: 
¶ 18 The original version was initially 
recommended by the Advisory Committee on Rules 
of Evidence, Rules of Practice and Procedure of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States (Advisory 
Committee). Rules of Evidence for United States 
4  “We have previously held that a criminal conviction cannot be sustained where 
the only evidence of some essential element of the crime is a prior inconsistent 
statement. State v. White Water (1981), 194 Mont. 85, 89, 634 P.2d 636, 639; State v. 
Gommenginger (1990), 242 Mont. 265, 278, 790 P.2d 455, 463; State v. Jolly (1941), 
112 Mont. 352, 355-56, 116 P.2d 686, 687-88 (holding prior inconsistent statement 
insufficient for conviction before the current Montana rule was enacted); compare 
State v. Fitzpatrick (1980), 186 Mont. 187, 195-98, 606 P.2d 1343, 1348-49 (holding 
prior inconsistent statement of witness admissible as substantive evidence); State v. 
Woods (1983), 203 Mont. 401, 411-12, 662 P.2d 579, 584.” State v. Giant, 2001 MT 245, 
307 Mont. 74, 79-80, 37 P.3d 49, 52-53 overruled by State v. Swann, 2007 MT 126, 337 
Mont. 326, 160 P.3d 511.
“Further, we have frequently held that evidence of flight is not sufficient in itself to 
prove guilt. State v. Davis, 2000 MT 199, ¶ 41, 300 Mont. 458, ¶ 41, 5 P.3d 547, ¶ 41; 
State v. Hall, 1999 MT 297, ¶ 47, 297 Mont. 111, ¶ 47, 991 P.2d 929, ¶ 47; State v. Pat-
ton (1996), 280 Mont. 278, 290, 930 P.2d 635, 642; State v. Bonning (1921), 60 Mont. 
362, 364-65, 199 P. 274, 275 overruled on other grounds by State v. Campbell (1965), 
146 Mont. 251, 263, 405 P.2d 978, 985; State v. Paisley (1907), 36 Mont. 237, 252, 92 
P. 566, 571; see also United States v. Flores (5th Cir.1977), 564 F.2d 717, 718-19 (find-
ing flight alone insufficient to infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).” State v. Giant, 
2001 MT 245, 307 Mont. 74, 80, 37 P.3d 49, 53 overruled by State v. Swann, 2007 MT 
126, 337 Mont. 326, 160 P.3d 511.
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Courts and Magistrates, Amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, 56 F.R.D. 
183, 293 (1973); Blakey, at 6. This version was 
recommended based on the assertion by modern 
commentators on evidence that cross examination 
during trial was sufficient both to remove prior 
inconsistent statements from the definition of 
hearsay, and to provide the jury a means to assess the 
reliability and trustworthiness of these statements. 
WEINSTEIN’S, §§ 801App.01 [4] at 14-18, [5] at 
36-36.3 (Advisory Committee’s letter to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and clarification after Rule 
801(d)(1)(A) was enacted); Blakey, at 41; 56 F.R.D. 
at 295-96. These commentators asserted that this 
reasoning was as sound as the rationale behind the 
other exclusions and exceptions from the hearsay 
rule. WEINSTEIN’S, § 801App.01[4] at 18; compare 
Rule 801(d)(1)(C), M.R.Evid., (pretrial identification); 
… Finally, the original proposal was also supported 
by findings that prior statements made nearer in 
time to an incident were more accurate and free from 
outside influences. MCCORMICK, § 251, at 116 & 
n.12; WEINSTEIN’S, § 801 App.01[4] at 15-16.
¶ 19 The Commission Comments to Montana 
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) indicate that Montana relied on the 
above rationale behind the original federal proposal 
in enacting this State’s rule. The Comments state that 
the Commission believed cross examination during 
trial was sufficient to remove such statements from 
the definition of hearsay and that to require the prior 
inconsistent statement be made under trial conditions 
would defeat the usefulness of the rule. (Emphasis 
added).
State v. Giant, 2001 MT 245, 307 Mont. 74, 81-82, 37 P.3d 49, 
54 overruled by State v. Swann, 2007 MT 126, 337 Mont. 326, 160 
P.3d 511d. However, the Court never made the direct connection 
between 801(d)(1)(C) and the witness’ identification of the 
husband as her attacker. If M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C) had been used, 
it clearly would have allowed evidence that the wife had first 
identified the husband, without having to establish that this was 
inconsistent with her trial testimony. As always, the proponent 
should point out that there are two separate bases for admission 
of the contested evidence  
wherever possible. 
The Montana Supreme Court also decided an “identification” 
case in 1996, but again inexplicably made no reference at all 
to M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C). Further, the Court wrongly held that 
the pretrial identification of the father as “the shooter” by his 
daughter, who testified at trial, was inadmissible. State v. Stuit, 
277 Mont. 227, 921 P.2d 866 (1996). Stuit was convicted of felony 
criminal endangerment. At trial, the investigating police officer 
testified that he saw bullet holes in the door jamb leading to the 
children’s room. The mother and the daughter told the officer 
that the father was the shooter. The father’s defense was that 
someone else, who had recently moved from the house,  
shot the gun. 
The mother did not testify at trial, but Shannon, the daughter, 
did:
Shannon testified the offense occurred in the 
month of December 1992. She further testified that 
she was sitting on the couch with her mother and 
Stuit when he shot the rifle five times into the wall. 
Thus, Shannon testified from personal observation as 
to the shooting, the identity of the shooter, and the 
approximate date. The admissible testimony from the 
officer that there were at least seven bullet holes in 
the wall and door jamb, and that from his experience 
the five bullet holes in the wall could have been made 
from someone sitting on the couch in the living room, 
corroborated her testimony. He also testified that he 
had recovered a .22 rifle from the bedroom Sharon 
and Stuit had shared. From Shannon’s testimony 
as to her personal observations and the admissible 
corroborating testimony of the officer, the State 
established the occurrence of the shooting and the 
identity of the shooter.
State v. Stuit, 277 Mont. 227, 232, 921 P.2d 866, 870 
(1996)
 However, the Court held that that part of the officer’s trial 
testimony in which he identified Stuit as the shooter, based on 
the identification of Shannon before trial, was inadmissible. The 
Supreme Court applied the general definition of hearsay, but 
apparently neither counsel nor the Court read any further in 
Rule 801 than (c):
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by 
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. Rule 801(c), M.R.Evid. The police officer’s 
testimony at trial as to the identity of the shooter and 
the specific date of the offense was admittedly based 
on out-of-court statements made to him by Sharon 
McLain and her daughter, Shannon. The officer had 
no personal knowledge of the alleged incident which 
had occurred approximately two weeks prior to his 
investigation.
State v. Stuit, 277 Mont. 227, 230-31, 921 P.2d 866, 868-69 
(1996). The State apparently conceded that the pretrial statement 
of identity was hearsay, and claimed on appeal that Shannon’s 
pretrial identification as admissible under an exception to the 
hearsay rule, M.R.E. 804(a)(3). The State did not argue at either 
level that it was not hearsay at all per 801(d)(1)(C). The Supreme 
Court held that the trial judge had erred in admitting the officer’s 
testimony as to the identity of the shooter. (It found the error to 
be harmless, and affirmed the conviction). 
In fact, if the prosecutor and the Supreme Court had correctly 
applied M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C), the jury should have been able to 
hear both Shannon’s in-court identification of her father and, 
from either Shannon herself or the police officer or both, the fact 
that on the night of the investigation, Shannon also identified her 
father as the shooter. 
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The opinion does not contain the verbatim testimony of the 
police officer, so perhaps the problem lay in the phrasing of the 
question. If the prosecution asked the officer: “Who was the 
shooter?” a proper and sustained objection would be either (or 
both—they are the flip sides of each other) “Foundation—no 
personal knowledge—may I voir dire?” or “Hearsay—may I voir 
dire?” However, M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C) clearly would allow these 
questions from either side: “Did Shannon identify the shooter 
on the night you first visited the home?” and “Whom did she 
identify then?” Different from 801(d)(1)(A) and (B), it does not 
matter whether the identification is consistent or inconsistent 
with the testimony at trial. Thus, 801(d)(1)(C) authorizes all 
parties to admit pretrial identifications so long as the identifier 
does testify at trial.
In State v. Harris, 247 Mont. 405, 808 P.2d 453 (1991), 
defendant Harris was accused of sexual abuse of two young 
children for whom she babysat. One of the witnesses at trial was 
a therapist who specialized in sexual abuse patients, and who 
had treated both children. The Supreme Court, and presumably 
the trial court and lawyers, embarked on a difficult and divisive 
analysis of Montana’s hearsay exception for medical diagnosis 
and treatment (803(4)) and the residual or catch-all exceptions 
found at the end of Rules 803 and 804. 
The opinion, again, totally omits any discussion of Rule 
801(d)(1)(C), even though the dissent framed one issue as “Did 
the District Court err in allowing Ms. Burns [the therapist] to 
identify the defendant as the perpetrator of the alleged crimes 
by testifying as to hearsay statements made to her by the victims 
during the course of therapy?” State v. Harris, 247 Mont. 405, 
422, 808 P.2d 453, 463 (1991).
The plain language of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) answers the 
question: if the identifier testifies at trial (as both victims did), 
then evidence of pretrial “identification of a person made after 
perceiving the person” is not hearsay. There is no need to discuss 
the parameters of any specific hearsay exception, or of the 
residual exceptions. Ms. Burns should have been able to tell the 
jury that the victims had identified to her the person or persons 
who had abused them. The majority of the Supreme Court held 
just the opposite: “Because Robby was available to identify and 
did indeed identify defendant as the perpetrator of the crime, the 
hearsay statements to which Burns testified were not the most 
probative evidence on the matter. As we noted above, Burns’ 
testimony on this issue was merely cumulative, serving only to 
bolster Robby’s testimony.” State v. Harris, 247 Mont. 405, 414, 
808 P.2d 453, 458 (1991) (emphasis added). The strong dissent 
also failed to apply the clearest and easiest analysis, 801(d)(1)(C). 
In contrast to the dearth of Montana cases, there is a 
plethora of federal cases interpreting 801(d)(1)(C)
The United States Supreme Court decided the seminal case 
on identification as non-hearsay in Owens v. U.S., 484 U.S. 556 
(1988). A prison guard was assaulted, resulting in a severe head 
injury and memory problems. The FBI visited him twice in the 
hospital shortly after the attack. On the first visit, he couldn’t 
remember anything about the incident. On the second visit, he 
named Owens as the attacker, and then picked him out of an 
array of photographs. The victim testified at trial, but said that 
he no longer had had any present recollection of the event. He 
did remember making the prior identification in the hospital. On 
appeal, the 9th Circuit upheld both of the defendant’s challenges 
to introduction of the pretrial identification: hearsay and 
confrontation.
The Supreme Court granted cert to resolve conflicts in the 
circuits on both issues, and concluded that neither the hearsay 
rule nor the right of confrontation clause had been violated. 
The conviction was affirmed. Discussing F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C), 
the Court observed:
This reading seems even more compelling when 
the Rule is compared with Rule 804(a)(3), which 
defines “[u]navailability as a witness” to include 
situations in which a declarant “testifies to a lack 
of memory of the subject matter of the declarant’s 
statement.” Congress plainly was aware of the re-
current evidentiary problem at issue here-witness 
forgetfulness of an underlying event-but chose not 
to make it an exception to Rule 801(d)(1)(C).
The reasons for that choice are apparent from 
the Advisory Committee’s Notes on Rule 801 and 
its legislative history. The premise for Rule 801(d)
(1)(C) was that, given adequate safeguards against 
suggestiveness, out-of-court identifications were 
generally preferable to courtroom identifications. 
Advisory Committee’s Notes on Rule 801, 28 U.S.C. 
App., p. 717. Thus, despite the traditional view 
that such statements were hearsay, the Advisory 
Committee believed that their use was to be fos-
tered rather than discouraged. Similarly, the House 
Report on the Rule noted that since, “[a]s time goes 
by, a witness’ memory will fade and his identifica-
tion will become less reliable,” minimizing the bar-
riers to admission of more contemporaneous iden-
tification is fairer to defendants and prevents “cases 
falling through because the witness can no longer 
recall the identity of the person he saw commit the 
crime.” H.R.Rep. No. 94-355, p. 3 (1975). See also 
S.Rep. No. 94-199, p. 2 (1975), U.S.Code Cong. & 
Admin.News, 1975, pp. 1092, 1094. To judge from 
the House and Senate Reports, Rule 801(d)(1)(C) 
was in part directed to the very problem here at is-
sue: a memory loss that makes it impossible for the 
witness to provide an in-court identification or tes-
tify about details of the events underlying an earlier 
identification.
U.S. v. Owens, 484 U.S. at 562-63, 108 S.Ct. at 844 (1988). 
Thus, the Court held that neither the Confrontation Clause nor 
Federal Rule of Evidence 802 is violated by admission of an 
identification statement of a witness who is unable, because of a 
memory loss, to testify concerning the basis for the identification.
484 U.S. at 564, 108 S.CT. at 845. 
WestlawNext reports 411 federal cases which discuss Owens 
and therefore pretrial identifications. (For the purposes of this 
article, I have not read all of those cases. Obviously, some of them 
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are solely about the Confrontation Clause component, while 
others focus on the rule.) When the search is changed to find for 
all federal cases discussing 801(d)(1)(C), it brings back 121 cases. 
The most recent of these sums up the current federal application:
[E]xtrajudicial witness identifications are 
routinely used as substantive evidence of guilt.” 
Foxworth v. St. Amand, 570 F.3d 414, 427 (1st 
Cir.2009) (citing Samuels v. Mann, 13 F.3d 522, 
527 (2nd Cir.1993); Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(C). 
Moreover, the fact that neither of the Taits iden-
tified petitioner in court would not render the 
evidence insufficient to convict petitioner. “There 
is no requirement, either in the Constitution or in 
the usual rules that apply to the admission of evi-
dence, that a witness who makes an extrajudicial 
identification of a criminal defendant must repeat 
the identification in the courtroom.” Foxworth, 
570 F.3d at 427; See also Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 
496, 505–11 (6th Cir.2003) (upholding the admis-
sion of out-of-court statements of a minor victim 
which were admitted under Ohio Evid. R 801(d)
(1)(C) as a prior identification of petitioner, even 
though victim was unwilling to testify about the 
statements at trial and did not remember making 
them).
Thomas v. Perry, 2013 WL 1747799 (E.D.Mich. 
2013).
The fact that Montana’s version of 801(d)(1)(C) was 
specifically adopted verbatim from the F.R.E. version means that 
these federal cases will be very helpful to Montana lawyers and 
judges who are faced with pretrial identification admissibility 
issues in our state courts. 
Pretrial Identifications may be unconstitutional, even 
if they meet the requirements of M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C)
Lots of Montana criminal cases do deal with admissibility 
of formal police-sponsored identifications on constitutional, 
rather than evidentiary, grounds. The absence of discussion of a 
hearsay objection probably indicates that both sides understood 
that these identifications are defined as non-hearsay, but counsel 
should always consider making raising two grounds rather than 
just one, if at all possible. Identifications made by witnesses at 
trial are not hearsay, but if the identifier does not testify at trial, 
the opponent should object on hearsay as well as constitutional 
grounds. U.S. v. Owens, supra, dealt with the Confrontation 
Clause; many other cases raise Due Process objections to 
government-sponsored identifications.
As an example of the second type of constitutional objection, 
in State v. Lally, a police officer who unsuccessfully chased two 
vehicles but saw at least one driver was shown photographs of 
two suspects, and identified one of them, who was then charged 
and tried. The photograph the officer-witness identified was a 
mug shot, labeled “Sheriff’s Office, Missoula MT;” the other was 
a photo shot in a person’s living room. The defendant moved to 
exclude all evidence of the officer’s identification. After a pretrial 
hearing, the judge denied the motion and the Supreme Court 
affirmed his decision. 
Lally’s challenge and the Supreme Court decision were both 
based on the Due Process Clause. Neither made any mention 
of M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C), which clearly would have allowed the 
evidence.
¶ 14 A defendant’s constitutional right to due 
process bars the admission of evidence deriving from 
suggestive identification procedures where there is a 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. 
See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196–98, 93 S.Ct. 
375, 380–82, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); State v. Lara, 
179 Mont. 201, 204–05, 587 P.2d 930, 931–32 (1978); 
*63 State v. Higley, 190 Mont. 412, 420–21, 621 P.2d 
1043, 1049 (1980); State v. Schoffner, 248 Mont. 260, 
265–66, 811 P.2d 548, 552 (1991)….
¶ 15 We apply a two-part test to determine 
whether an in-court identification based on a 
pretrial identification is admissible. We first 
determine whether the pretrial identification 
procedure was impermissibly suggestive. If it was, 
we then determine, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, whether the suggestive procedure 
created a substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification. 
State v. Lally, 2008 MT 452, 348 Mont. 59, 62-
63, 199 P.3d 818, 821. (The Court ultimately held 
that although the procedure used was possibly too 
suggestive, in the end, it did not “create a substantial 
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”) See 
also, State v. Baldwin, 318 Mont. 489, 81 P.3d 488 
(2003); State v. DuBray, 317 Mont. 377, 77 P.3d 247 
(2003); State v. Rudolph, 238 Mont. 135, 777 P.2d 
296 (1989).
These cases are good reminders that trial lawyers cannot 
rely solely on the rules of evidence to protect their clients. Even 
where the M.R.E. appear to allow a piece of evidence, the federal 
and state constitutions may provide a firmer basis for objection. 
(In a later piece, I will discuss the most recent U.S. and Montana 
Supreme Court cases on the right to confrontation).
Conclusion
Montana’s version of 801(d)(1)(C) mirrors F.R.E. 801(d)
(1)(C), but it does not seem that the Montana rule is used 
very often in reported cases. It is a good tool to escape from a 
hearsay objection, and thus avoid a protracted excursion into the 
numerous hearsay exceptions. By its plain terms, M.R.E. 801(d)
(1)(C) applies in both civil and criminal cases, to both sides in 
any case. (There are additional constitutional considerations 
when pretrial identifications are used by the prosecution in 
criminal cases.) Try using it.
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